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Article
Snoozing Democracy:
Sunset Clauses, De-Juridification, and
Emergencies
Antonios Kouroutakis
Sofia Ranchordás
“[There is] no cure for law but more law.”
-Karl Llewellyn1
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1. In the context of teaching first-year law students, Karl Llewellyn wrote:

Details, unnumbered, shifting, sharp, disordered, unchartable, jagged.
And all of this that goes on in class but an excuse to start you on a
wilderness of other matters you need. The thicket presses in, the great
hooked spikes rip clothes and hide and eyes. High sun, no path, no
light, thirst and the thorns. —I fear there is no cure. No cure for law
but more law. No vision save at the cost of plunging deeper.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930),
reprinted in CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A
JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 9, 9 (2002).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

At times of crisis, fewer rules are often regarded as more.2
Fewer rules may mean more expeditious decisions,3 more
effective reactions to threats to national security,4 financial
support for economic sectors in need,5 and less bureaucracy. At
2. Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004)
(discussing Mies van der Rohe’s adoption of the phrase as a slogan for
modernism in architecture that reputedly provoked Frank Lloyd Wright to
respond that “less is only more where more is no good”); id. (citing JOHN SMITH,
THE MYSTERIE OF RHETORIQUE UNVAIL’D 56 (1657) and Robert Browning,
Andrea Del Sarto, in MEN AND WOMEN for the arguments that the phrase “less
is more” may have derived from attempts to define the trope known as
“meiosis.”). For an analysis in the specific context of crisis, see OREN GROSS &
FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (2006) (“[W]hen a nation is faced with emergencies
its legal, and even constitutional, structure must be somewhat relaxed . . . .”).
3. In a number of countries, administrative decision-making procedures
are relaxed at times of economic crisis in order to avoid regulatory delay. For
example, this was the position taken in the Netherlands with the Crisis en
Herstelwet (Crisis and Recovery Act) that aimed to foster sustainable
development and innovation in the construction and energy sectors after the
global financial crisis in 2008. Legislators realized that long waiting periods
imposed by the existing administrative system delayed the acquisition of
required licenses and permits. This Act authorized the enactment of
experimental regulations that derogated from existing rules in order to
facilitate the operationalization of construction projects. This was the case of
the expansion of the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. The Act entered into effect
in March 2010 originally in a ‘record’ period of seven months, and was converted
into a permanent statute in March 2013. See Nico Verhey, The Fast and the
Furious: De Crisis en Herstelwet, 27 REGELMAAT 140 (2012) (describing the
drafting process of the Crisis and Recovery Statute); Jan Roording, Versnelling
van Wetgeving: over Uiteenlopende Ontwikkelingen en Eigenwijze Actoren, 27
REGELMAAT 126, 127 (2012) (examining the accelerated process of the
legislation and the difficulties in gathering political consensus for enacting the
Crisis and Recovery Act).
4. See President George W. Bush, Address on the Patriot Act & the
National Security Agency (Dec. 17, 2005) (transcript available in Martin
Medhurst & Paul Stob, George W. Bush on the Patriot Act and the National
Security Agency, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC, http://www.presidentialrhetoric.
com/speeches/12.17.05.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (“The Patriot Act tore
down the legal and bureaucratic wall that kept law enforcement and
intelligence authorities from sharing vital information about terrorist threats.
And the Patriot Act allowed federal investigators to pursue terrorists with tools
they already used against other criminals. Congress passed this law with a
large, bipartisan majority, including a vote of 98-1 in the United States
Senate.”).
5. Financial intervention at times of crisis must, however, be limited in
time—this has not always been clear. In 2014, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) analyzed the Netherlands’ intervention
in the housing market and suggested the introduction of sunset clauses in
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times of crisis we observe a phenomenon called temporary dejuridification, which is the strategic disappearance or
suspension of law.6 Temporary de-juridification in the context of
emergencies can mean that special and extraordinary measures
are enacted to respond to a certain crises, in derogation of
existing standards and rules. Certain rules—thought to be more
burdensome and incompatible with wartime or economic
crises—thus “disappear,” being replaced, for example, by
simplified procedures or exceptional rules. To illustrate, in the
European context, state aid to national firms is not generally
allowed since it can impair the functioning of the European
single market.7 However, during the 2008–09 economic crisis,
measures designed to support financial institutions and the housing market in
order to limit risks. See Heleen M.J. Hofmans & Clement P. Van de Coevering,
How to Deal with Contingent Liabilities—Lessons from the Dutch Experience, 1
OECD J. BUDGETING 35, 37–43 (2014) (“In response to the financial crisis, the
Dutch government has provided substantial support to financial institutions,
sovereigns and the housing market.”). In the United States, the efforts to
overcome the crisis were visible in the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, which aimed to promote
employment and assist a number of economic sectors by including measures to
increase unemployment benefits, stimulate investments in the energy industry,
healthcare, and construction, and improve new facilities.
6. The term de-juridification has often been used in different fields of law
to refer to the strategic disappearance of law, often with negative repercussions
for the rights of individual subjects. By adding the adjective “temporary,” we
refer more specifically to the disappearance of law circumscribed to a certain
period of time. This normally occurs in the context of crises when rules are
considered as hurdles to effective decision-making and executive action.
Temporary de-juridification has, however, remained highly overlooked in the
context of emergencies. We find more references to de-juridification, for
example, in the field of labor law, to refer to the exemption of labor law
standards, such as decent work standards. See Siobhan Mullally, Introduction:
Decent Work, Domestic Work: Gendered Borders and Immigration, in CARE,
MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 10 (Siobhan Mullally
ed., 2015). See also Marcelo Neves, Between Under-Integration and OverIntegration: Not Taking Citizenship Seriously, in IMAGINING BRAZIL 61, 69–70
(Jesse Souza & Valter Sinder eds., 2007) (discussing de-juridification processes
that enact exemptions and limitations to work standards impacting
integration). De-juridification has also been employed in family law. See ALISON
DIDUCK, LAW’S FAMILIES 183–84 (2003) (“[A]nother goal of this legislation may
have been to relieve expenditure and costs related to the litigation of child
support disputes . . . . [B]ut unlike other de-juridification measures which
provided incentives to encourage families to order their own affairs . . . , this
was a shift towards interventionism.”) (emphasis added).
7. State aid is regulated by a number of treaty provisions and regulations.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 107–09, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 1 [hereinafter TFEU];
Council Regulation 659/1999 of Mar. 22, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 83) 1–9 (prescribing
detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the TFEU); Communication
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the European Commission allowed for more flexibility at this
level, authorizing the adoption of temporary measures to ensure
that European companies would continue investing in research
and development in spite of financial strain.8
Another form of temporary de-juridification occurs through
the temporary suspension of legal dispositions regarding the
exercise of individual rights. For example, this is the case with
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which has been at stake
in times of crisis for centuries (see Part III infra). This form of
de-juridification has more recently regained a place in the legal
literature in case of suspicion of future involvement in acts of
terrorism.9
Temporary de-juridification also means the executive may
be allowed to derogate from a number of constitutional
principles, and even use armed forces to quash insurrections
during a state of emergency.10 Past states of emergencies, the
most notable occurring in Weimar Germany, have shown that at
times of crisis, the executive may be allowed to act as necessary,
from the Commission on the Application, from 1 January 2012, of State Aid
Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial
Crisis, 2011 O.J. (C 356) 7.
8. Although there was already a simplified notice from the Commission
for state aid measures, these rules were not applicable to the measures adopted
in the context of the financial crisis, namely, the Temporary Union Framework
for State Aid Measures. See Communication from the European Commission on
the Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial
Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis, 2008 O.J. (C
270) 8; Communication from the European Commission on Temporary
Community Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in
the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 2009 O.J. (C 16) 1; Communication
from the Commission on a European Economic Recovery Plan, COM (2008) 800
final (Nov. 26, 2008). Specific and temporary ad hoc arrangements have been
put in place in order to deal with these cases in a timely manner. By introducing
a common temporary framework, the Commission allows temporary and
exceptionally well-targeted state aid, unblock lending to companies and
stimulate investment in research and development. The adoption of these
temporary measures evidences a more flexible approach to state aid rules or
even a derogation of the existing framework.
9. See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE
L.J. 600 (2009) (analyzing suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and exploring
the relationship between suspension, executive power, and individual rights in
American history).
10. See Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive
Discretion to Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027,
1029 (2008) (“[T]he question posed is not whether to use armed force in certain
situations but what limitations there should be on that use . . . . [the] federal
government may need to resort to armed force to quash insurrections or execute
federal laws.”).
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even if this implies circumventing statutes, treaties, and the
constitution.11 Although we acknowledge the existence of
emergency powers, we often forget to discuss its real meaning
and limits. Does the need to make decisions in a timely manner
always justify the disappearance of law? Do we know what
temporary de-juridification means for the relationship between
the different political branches? Furthermore, is ‘less,’ in the
sense of fewer rules and legal limits, always ‘more?’ This Article
aims to contribute to the understanding of the concept of
‘temporary de-juridification’—as well as its virtues and vices.
The word “de-juridification” might convey a fresh and fairly
unknown legal vision for states of emergency and other crises.
However, the temporary suspension of laws is nevertheless far
from being a recent practice.12 Instead, it has been concretized
for centuries through so-called sunset clauses.13 Sunset clauses
are legislative dispositions that provide that a specific piece of
legislation shall expire automatically on a specific date.14 Sunset
law has been defined as a “statute under which a governmental
agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed

11. See Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis:
The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 507, 508 (2012) (“Our Constitution was founded on the hope that
government can be structured to limit the ambitions of public officials who are
tempted to abuse their power. What we find, instead, is a willingness to
abandon the system of checks and balances to facilitate prompt action, often at
the cost of individual liberties and constitutional violations. There are many
ways to summarize this trend. I call it ‘presidentialism,’ the assertion that what
we need in times of crisis (real or contrived) is a President free to act as
necessary, even if in violation of statutes, treaties, and the Constitution.”).
12. See Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012) (remarking that recent debates on the
implementation of the suspension clause during wartime have not taken into
account historical evidence and demonstrating that the temporary suspension
of laws is far from being a recent problem by referring to the English tradition,
the Founding period, the imprisonment of Japanese fighters, and more recently,
to the detention of American citizens in the wake of the terrorists attacks of
September 11, 2001).
13. See Mark D. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional
Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J.
853, 854 (1978) (“‘Sunset’ is the popular term for a statutory method of forcing
a legislature to make a periodic determination whether to allow a particular
program or agency to continue.”). See also John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses and
Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of Sunset Provisions in
Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 442 (2010).
14. For a thorough analysis of sunset clauses, including a historical
overview of this instrument, see SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, CONSTITUTIONAL
SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION (2014).
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period unless it is formally renewed.”15 The idea underlying the
use of these dispositions is to terminate a number of dispositions
when they are no longer necessary.16
When adequately framed, sunset clauses should further the
principle of separation of powers—even in times of crisis—
limiting the extraordinary powers of the executive to a short
period and imposing rigorous legislative oversight.17 By
conferring a temporary character to a law, sunset clauses
manage legislative inertia since the continued validity of a law
will be contingent upon a new legislative decision.18 These
dispositions limit the duration of extraordinary powers and
guarantee a more frequent dialogue between the executive and
parliament.19 Sunset clauses were therefore originally employed
to improve political accountability and transparency, by
ensuring that unnecessary regulations and agencies would be
terminated.20
While ideally the ‘sun’ should not set on legislation before
an evaluation takes place, sunset clauses seem to have acquired
somewhat of a bad reputation. The literature has pointed out
that the practice of states with sunset clauses seems to reveal
that these temporary legislative measures have often been
15. Sunset Law, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
16. Sunset clauses were widely used in the twentieth century in the United
States as instruments to combat legislative inertia, the growing power of the
executive, and the existence of unnecessary laws, programs, and agencies. See
Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 209,
210–12 (1985) (explaining that sunset provisions emerged as a reaction to the
general discontent with the uncontrolled governmental growth, excessive
bureaucracy, and public spending). For a more recent analysis of the use of
sunset clauses, see Symposium, Showcase Panel IV: A Federal Sunset Law, 16
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 339, 342 (2012).
17. See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State
Experience, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 55 (1990).
18. See John Ip, Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation, PUB. L.
74, 75 (2013) (analyzing the enactment of sunset clauses in the context of the
terrorist threats and the underlying rationale of this legislative instrument).
19. See Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 401 (1978) (discussing the first examples of sunset clauses in Colorado and
subsequent enactments in other states). See also KATHERINE R. WILLIAMSON,
REVISITING AND EVALUATING THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (2009). This
rationale for using sunset clauses has also been argued in Germany. See JAN
FUNKE, BU ROKRATIEABBAUE MIT HILFE ZEITLICH BEFRISTETER GESETZE 43
(2011) [Reduction of Bureaucracy with the Help of Temporary Legislation: The
Effects of Sunset Legislation].
20. See Lewis A. Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in
Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393
(1981).
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reauthorized without a meaningful evaluation21 or have served
primarily to ‘sweeten’ legislative opponents to vote in favor of a
controversial law.22 In addition, since sunset clauses are often
renewed without being adequately revisited, temporary dejuridification has become ‘democracy’s snooze button,’ and
instead of reacting to the obsolescence of legislation, the
adoption of sunset clauses simply postpones decisions regarding
extraordinary powers.23 Therefore, sunset clauses might not
always be a shield against the normalization of extraordinary
emergency provisions.24 Consequently, does this mean that
sunset clauses are a dangerous legislative instrument that
should be banned altogether since they may be misused?
Our answer to this question is clearly no—despite the
potential downsides of sunset clauses, the problem here is not to
include or leave out the temporary character of de-juridification
during wartime or peace. Rather, the main objectives of this
21. See Christian van Stolk & Mihaly Fazekas, How Evaluation Is
Accommodated in Emergency Policy Making, in EVALUATION AND TURBULENT
TIMES: REFLECTIONS ON A DISCIPLINE IN DISARRAY 161, 169, 173 (Jan-Eric
Furubo et al. eds., 2013) (“[T]he first hypothesis relating to a decrease of the
quantity and quality of evaluation used in emergency policy making is clearly
supported by evidence . . . . [T]he relative absence of evaluation in the
formulation of emergency legislation is not that surprising.”).
22. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1041 (2011) (providing a critical overview of the use of sunset clauses in the case
of tax cuts). For more information regarding sunset clauses focusing on the field
of tax law, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of
Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006) (criticizing
dispositions for being apparatuses that “underestimate the revenue costs of
legislation or fit legislation within predetermined budget constraints”). Kysar
additionally argues that by enacting sunset clauses, lawmakers try to reduce
the estimation of the revenue costs of these laws and thus gather sufficient
political consensus, since the calculation would only take the sunset period into
account. However, in practice, the original plan was never to sunset these tax
cuts but to renew them later. See id. Moreover, Kysar adds that sunset clauses
have been used to circumvent budgetary constraints and enact laws meant to
last under the “cover” of a temporary provision.
23. See David A. Fahrenthold, In Congress, Sunset Clauses are Commonly
Passed but Rarely Followed Through, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-congress-sunset-clauses-arecommonly-passed-but-rarely-followed-through/2012/12/15/9d8e3ee0-43b511e2-8e70-e1993528222d_story.html (“Outdated laws were piling up. Bad ones
weren’t being fixed. So lawmakers turned to ‘sunset clauses’—expiration dates
forcing Congress to reconsider old laws before they disappeared. Instead,
Washington’s current crisis reveals that the sunset clause has become
something unintended: democracy’s snooze button.”).
24. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1090 (2003) (discussing the
dangers of the normalization of emergency legislation).
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Article are first to demonstrate that the tendency to de-juridify
as a response to changes in circumstances might be necessary,
but is not always a positive development. Second, this Article
points out that temporary de-juridification is far from being a
recent or national problem or trend, and instead started in
traditional common law, and is now expanding to numerous civil
law countries. Third, this Article argues that temporary dejuridification is at times necessary to confer flexibility to the
legal order, but such de-juridification must be conditioned upon
the protection of fundamental rights and the separation of
powers. Fourth, this Article innovates in relation to existing
literature by suggesting a normative framework for temporary
de-juridification.
This Article is part of a broader literature that surged after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when the use of sunset
clauses to tackle the phenomenon of international terrorism took
place on a record scale, from the United States and Canada,25 to
the United Kingdom, Germany,26 and Australia.27 The aim of

25. For literature regarding Canada, see Tobi Cohen, Controversial AntiTerror Bill Passes, Allowing Preventative Arrests, Secret Hearings, NAT’L POST
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/25/controversial-antiterror-bill-passes-allowing-preventative-arrests-secret-hearings/ (referring to
Bill S-7, which passed in the wake of the Boston terrorist attacks and introduced
stricter anti-terrorism rules). Cohen discusses rules introduced in Canada
which included preventative arrest provisions which would allow an individual
suspected of engaging in terrorist activity to be preventively imprisoned, be
secretly arraigned, or be prevented from departing Canada to engage in
terrorist activities. Id. (“The original legislation had a sunset clause of 2007 so
the measures could be reviewed and, if deemed necessary, reintroduced by
Parliament. The Conservatives have since tried to resurrect the bill four times,
but each time it died after an election was called.”).
26. In Germany, this was the case of the Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz
[Anti-Terrorism Act], which, in 2002, introduced several temporary limitations
to fundamental rights on the grounds of the need to safeguard national security.
See Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus [Act for
Combatting International Terrorism] Jan. 9, 2002, BGBl I at 361, no. 3 (Ger.).
Article 22 imposed significant limitations on fundamental rights such as data
privacy, grant of entry visas, and identity control through January 11, 2007.
For a comparative study of the counterterrorism responses of different countries
including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Canada, see THE
CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERTERRORISM (Martha Crenshaw ed., 2010). In the
wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, and the growing number of
European Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) fighters in Syria, stricter
legislative responses can be expected. See Daniel Tost, Germany Set to Pass ‘One
of the Harshest’ Anti-Terror Laws in Europe, EURACTIV (Feb. 5, 2015), http://
www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/germany-set-pass-oneharshest-anti-terror-laws-europe-311851.
27. For literature regarding Australia, see Nicola McGarrity et al., Sunset
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this Article is not to evaluate the efficiency or explore the value
of such clauses, or to argue in favor or against their use.28
Instead, it aims to shift the focus of the critique of sunset clauses
to the dipole between juridification and de-juridification, that is,
between the creation and the disappearance of law in the context
of emergencies, questioning what we can or cannot sunset and
under what circumstances. Methodologically, the analysis is not
attached to one single legal order, since the cardinal subject of
this paper transcends borders and paradigms, which are located
in a variety of legal orders, sufficing to mention here the United
States, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
This Article focuses on the relationship between law and
rupture in turbulent periods, i.e., in times of crisis,
circumstances may justify the temporary suspension of legal
guarantees and institutions, derogation of numerous rules, and
the allocation to the executive of an enhanced role in crisis
management. This is visible not only in counterterrorism
legislation but also in the context of the European financial
crisis, where an “extended executive,” composed of a multitude
of agencies at various levels, emerged to manage the credit
crisis.29 Moreover, crises confer a fluid character to rigid laws
until the critical situation comes to an end.30 When emergency
strikes, immediate top-down decisions must be taken without
time-consuming procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, or attempts
to gather consensus of potential political opponents.31 As we
mentioned earlier, this is, for example, the case of the European
Commission’s Temporary Union Framework for State Aid
Measures32 or the Dutch Crisis en Herstelwet. The first

Clauses in Australian Anti-Terror Laws, 33 ADELAIDE L. REV. 307 (2012).
28. Professor Ackerman endorses the use of sunset clauses during
emergencies. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J.
1029 (2004). Other scholars, including Gross, consider sunset clauses ineffective
tools. See Gross, supra note 24. A more recent evaluation of sunset clauses is
recorded in literature. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 13; Ip, supra note 18.
29. For more information on this occurring in the United Kingdom, see
Julia Black, The Credit Crisis and the Constitution, in THE REGULATORY STATE:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 92, 112–13 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 2010).
30. See Peter van Lochem & Nico Florijn, Does Necessity Know No Law? On
the Relative Significance of Legal Quality for Governmental Action, 2
LEGISPRUDENCE 231, 233 (2008).
31. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship:
Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2010).
32. Communication from the Commission of Jan. 22, 2009, Temporary
Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in the Current
Financial and Economic Crisis, 2009 OJ (C 16) at 1.
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document allowed European Union (EU) Member States to
grant, on a temporary and exceptional basis, well-targeted state
aid in order to unfreeze lending to companies and stimulate
investment. The latter was a law adopted to accelerate the
administrative decision-making procedure as to complex
projects and was itself an example of a temporary and complex
law enacted in less than seven months.33
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explore and
delimit the concept of ‘de-juridification,’ contrasting it to the
term ‘juridification.’ Then we explain the relationship between
temporary de-juridification and a state of emergency, since these
two concepts appear to be often associated. In Part II, we present
the concept of sunset clauses in legislation and we elaborate on
their use during emergencies. In Part III, we analyze how such
clauses can be a formula for de-juridification and discuss notable
historical and contemporary examples. Finally, we conclude
with some critical analysis of the past and the present use of
sunset clauses as a de-juridification mechanism in times of
crisis. We aim in Part IV to draw conclusions for future reference
and pose suggestions for a meaningful framework for temporary
de-juridification.
II. JURIDIFICATION AND DE-JURIDIFICATION
The concept of de-juridification is often mentioned in
literature,34 but rarely defined. At first sight, this term seems to
suggest “fewer rules,” which might convey a positive
development in a world inhabited by thousands of unnecessary
rules. However, this is an oversimplification of both the
phenomenon of extending the influence of law to new social
areas (juridification) and the process of making law disappear
strategically (de-juridification). Both concepts are complex and
ambivalent since they transmogrify into a deeper understanding
of the interaction between different branches of government.35
33. See supra text accompanying note 3.
34. See, e.g., Guy Neave, On the Cultivation of Quality, Efficiency and
Enterprise: An Overview of Recent Trends in Higher Education in Western
Europe, 1986–1988, 23 EURO. J. EDUC. 7, 13 (1988) (contrasting the
“juridification of British higher education” with that in other European
countries like the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Finland, which introduced
“a new flexibility to systems of control and evaluation precisely by lessening the
weight of formal legal control”).
35. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES,
CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 4 (2009) (“Juridification is not the
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Therefore, to get an understanding of temporary dejuridification, a core concept in this Article, one must first study
its companion, juridification, that has captivated the attention
of literature for a longer interval.36
In this Article, we argue that both juridification and dejuridification are transnational problems since they are found in
most Western countries.37 Today, we live in a world of national
and supranational rules, rights, and institutions that aim to
predict and regulate every single step we take. Juridification
underscores legal attempts to “colonize society” and conquer new
frontiers.38 This metaphor refers to the tendency to overregulate society, seeking any aspect which might be relevant
from a regulatory point of view. This international trend to
juridify39 has been translated not only into an increase in the
amount of rules and individual rights, but also into a
“reallocation of power to autonomous institutions such as the
courts.”40
The process of juridification is sometimes ambivalent, as we
will explain in the following section, because more rules do not
always mean more rights. However, as we mentioned previously,
fewer rules are not necessarily a more democratic alternative for
product of an imperial judiciary imposing its will or of an abdicating legislature
of weak executive . . . . Juridification is, instead, the product of the interaction
of these institutions, along with interest groups, parties, lobbyists, and policy
entrepreneurs alike . . . . Although there certainly are instances of direct
struggles between the branches, an exclusive focus on these obscures another
dimension of the juridification process—the interaction between and among
these institutions.”) (emphasis original).
36. See, e.g., JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL
WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). For a more recent analysis, see
Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The
Juridification of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 1 (2009) (exploring the
legal and non-legal governance mechanisms that compete in terms of dispute
resolution and behavioral controls, and the function of law in stabilizing
normative expectations).
37. See Jon Clark & Lord Wedderburn, Juridification—A Universal Trend?
The British Experience in Labor Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES
163 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
38. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987).
39. See Lars Chr. Blichner & Anders Molander, Mapping Juridification, 14
EUR. L.J. 36 (2008) (analyzing the concept of juridification in the European
context).
40. See Anne-Mette Magnussen & Anna Banasiak, Juridification:
Disrupting the Relationship between Law and Politics?, 19 EUR L.J. 325, 326
(2013).
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citizens. Resembling the opposite of juridification, dejuridification can be both a guarantee of effective solutions and
an instrument which can enable deprivation of fundamental
guarantees.41 In Part I, we examine the concept of dejuridification first by explaining where it comes from. Society
was first juridified due to an expansion of law to more areas of
society,42 and only then, the tendency to de-jurify emerged to
combat bureaucracy and obstacles to rapid decision-making
during emergencies. Second, we analyze the concept of dejuridification and explain why the tendency to make laws
disappear plays an important role in times of crisis.
A. JURIDIFICATION
In the beginning, there was no law, only communicative
rules developed within the intimacy of the family. With the
growing need to interact with strangers, some form of sovereign
was established to oversee these relations, giving rise in the
early modern period to the initiation of a process of
juridification.43
The term juridification refers thus primarily to the
relationship between state and society and more specifically, the
modern proliferation of laws.44 This expansion of the role of law
to different fields of society that remained for a number of years
unregulated, e.g., sports, education, or health, has been visible
in both the direct legal incursion of law and the voluntary
imposition of external norms and “an increasing resort to

41. See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits,
Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3, 9 (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1987).
42. See Ken Foster, The Juridification of Sport, in READINGS IN LAW AND
POPULAR CULTURE 155 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2011) (“Law in
liberal democracies is increasingly invasive. The realm of what is outside legal
regulation annually grows smaller. Law now regulates many areas of social life
that historically have appeared immune from law.”).
43. See ANDREW EDGAR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HABERMAS 245 (2005) (“[A]s
societies grow more complex, communicative competences that had been
developed within the intimacy of the family or small tribal groups become
inadequate for organizing fleeting and complex interactions with strangers.
Law provides a medium for such interaction . . . . In the early modern period,
this gives rise to the initiation of a process of juridification.”).
44. Id. (reflecting on Habermas’ concept of juridification and defining the
beginning of the juridification process as “the process by which modern law
becomes both more extensive in its scope and is more intensively organized in
terms of its fine details”).
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thinking and acting in a legal way without the imposition of case
law.”45 In other words, the juridification of society has been
translated in both the fact that legislators have enacted more
rules in numeric terms and the fact that actors have
acknowledged the coercive value of these legal rules and
principles—accepting their authority.46 However, as Cicero
predicted in Ancient Rome, “more laws” often mean “less
justice.”47
The term juridification does not only refer to the growing
number of rules—sometimes badly drafted—in our society,48 but
also to the effects of the expanding dominion of law as such.
Individuals perceive these effects differently, with Robert A.
Kagan explaining:
[T]o some, law is primarily a mode of repression . . . that
in actuality protects and legitimates existing political
and social hierarchies. To others, in contrast, law is an
instrument of liberation and social progress, a realm in
which courageous litigants and judges can subject the
preferences and prejudices of the powerful (or of selfish
political majorities) to the constraints of reason and
justice . . . .And to still others, the ever-expanding
‘juridification’ of everyday social and commercial life
imposes a stultifying formalization on human activity,
burying us under piles of paperwork, efficiency-depleting
45. See Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn & J.P. Rossow, The Juridification of
Sport: A Comparative Analysis of Children’s Rugby and Cricket in England and
South Africa, 36 J. JURID. SCI. 85, 87–88 (2011) (“[Juridification] is often used
to describe growth or expansion of the legal field. However, this understanding
of juridification is something of a simplification and rather crude . . . . [A] more
significant aspect of juridification can be seen not in terms of overt legal
intervention but rather a more indirect incorporation of legal norms. Here the
issue can be described, to use Foster’s term, as a process of domestication.
Rather than being focused upon direct legal incursion, this approach considers
the voluntary imposition of external norms and an increasing resort to thinking
and acting in a legal way without the imposition of case law or statute.”)
(emphasis added).
46. On the legitimacy of law understood as the acceptance of the process of
juridification, see ANDREW EDGAR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HABERMAS 250–51
(2005) (“The problem of the legitimacy of law lay at the heart of the process of
juridification. The main strands of the process may now be considered in a new
light.”).
47. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 35 (44 B.C.) (“More law, less justice.”).
48. This is far from being a recent problem. See Ulrich Karpen, On the State
of Legislation Studies in Europe, 7 EUR. J.L. REFORM 59, 59 (2006) (“The
complaint that there are too many and badly drafted laws is as old as it is
widespread, in Germany as in all countries of Europe.”).
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regulations, and initiative-stoppers . . . .49

As explained infra, these differences in perceived effects of
juridification may affect the limits of what should and should not
be de-juridified. On the one hand, juridification has thus been
defined as the “process[es] by which the state intervenes in areas
of social life (e.g., industrial relations, education, family, social
welfare, commerce) in ways that limit the autonomy of
individuals or groups to determine their own affairs.”50
Therefore, we can relate this aspect to the first and last
dimensions mentioned by Kagan: the expanding role of law
limits individual autonomy since law increasingly determines
what individuals can and cannot do. This perception has
conferred a pejorative meaning to the word juridification which
has also been associated in this context with “the petrification of
class conflict” and “social norms.”51 In the words of Teubner,
“juridification is an ugly word—as ugly as the reality which it
describes.”52 It refers to a crusade in search of justice at all costs,
empowered by as many laws as one can carry. Juridification is
therefore not only an ugly word, but it is sometimes a heavy word
which can lead to ambivalent effects, “failing to achieve the
desired results or doing so at the cost of destroying these
structures.”53
Thus, juridification refers to more than the weight of overregulation, bureaucracy, and red tape.54 This concept often
refers to the submission of an activity to legal regulation
(expansion of law) or more detailed legal regulation (increasing
density of law). This tendency is to expand the scope of law,
which is often “referred to when the formal legislature and/or the
judge become competent in situations where they previously

49. See Robert A. Kagan, Introduction to PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP
SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION vii–viii (2d ed. 2009) (explaining
the different roles of law in a society in transition).
50. See Jon Clark & Lord Wedderburn, Juridification—A Universal Trend?
The British Experience in Labor Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST
AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 163, 165 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (emphasis
added).
51. EMILIOS A. CHRISTODOULIDIS, LAW AND REFLEXIVE POLITICS 97 (2001).
52. Teubner, supra note 41, at 3.
53. Teubner, supra note 41, at 4.
54. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
634 (2d ed. 1997) (“Every move to juridification tends therefore to create
complaints of bureaucracy and red tape, provoking a whiplash effect.”).
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were not.”55 This growth is far from accepted, particularly when
policymakers seem to have the tendency to add a large number
of increasingly proscriptive rules to the over-regulated society
we live in.56 Instead, as Paul Kahn remarks, “our political
culture suffers from a dangerous disposition toward
juridification that undermines the exercise of political
responsibility by leadership alike.”57 This reflects a more general
discontent with the role of law and, above all, lawyers in our
society who “may be our leading political persons, but they are
also the object of an intense popular distrust.”58
Juridification may therefore be an ugly word, but it is
frequently a necessary one. The ambivalence of this concept is
reflected in the transition from a contemplative state to an
interventionist one and the triumph of the rule of law over
despotism.59 As mentioned supra, law can also be an
“instrument of liberation,”60 and it is a weapon to fight the
misappropriation of political power and corruption. Thus,
juridification is not always associated with heavy bureaucracy,
but may also represent positive efforts “to solve policy problems
by judicial means, as well as efforts to formalize, proceduralize,
and to automate the political process itself.”61 As Gordon
Silverstein analogizes from the example of the United States,
“juridification is not the product of an imperial judiciary

55. See Hans Zacher, Juridification in the Field of Social Law, in
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS
OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 375, 401
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
56. For a criticism of regulation, see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF
NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT 38
(2014) (“Specific rules supposedly provide clear metrics for enforcement. That’s
the theory, and that’s just about everyone insists on them—regulators,
lobbyists, and politicians . . . . But the legal details often cause people to act in
ways that undermine the public purpose.”).
57. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 68 (1999) (exploring the nature of contemporary legal
scholarship and the role of the rule of law).
58. Id.
59. See Bruno Debaenst, A Study on Juridification: The Case of Industrial
Accidents in Nineteenth Century Belgium, 81 LEGAL HIST. REV. 247, 248 (2013).
60. See Kagan, supra note 49, at vii.
61. See supra SILVERSTEIN, note 35, at 3 (2009) (analyzing the juridification
of American politics and the movement toward law, “[F]ear of the abuse of
political power and concerns about corruption have long been met by demands
for more law and less politics, for increasingly legalistic solutions to our
problems, including what Lawrence Friedman calls a demand for ‘total
justice’”).

44

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 25:1

imposing its will or of an abdicating legislature or weak
executive . . . juridification is, instead, the product of the
interaction of these institutions, along with interest groups,
parties, lobbyists, and policy entrepreneurs alike.”62
However, does this mean that the solution for this distrust
should reside in widespread de-juridification, diminishing the
empire of law? Understanding why juridification may be seen as
an ugly result, it is now time to turn to de-juridification and
explore whether some beauty might be found.
B.

DE-JURIDIFICATION

The juridification of emergency powers is important to
prevent the executive from abusing these temporary measures
and exercising abusive discretion in turbulent times. However,
in times of crisis we might just want to temporarily forget the
role of juridification and instead dismantle numerous legal
obstacles that might stand in the way of a solution in the midst
of an economic or political crisis. Emergencies that call for
decisive action by the executive often include the very prospect
of whether a certain situation can be qualified as a “state of
exception.”63
Although juridification is often regarded as the “enemy of
discretion” in practice, excessive bureaucracy might actually
hamper policy measures designed to solve crises.64 Heavy
juridification does not guarantee that better decisions will be
taken within a set deadline, but more frequently results in
“blind” or automatic decisions.65 In this section, we explain first
the concept of de-juridification, then delve into the often
necessary de-juridification at times of crisis.

62. See id. at 4.
63. Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 544 (2006) (“In its classic contours, an emergency calls for
rapid and decisive action by the executive branch, including the act of
designating the situation an emergency or a ‘state of exception.’ Declaring an
emergency means setting aside a normal state of affairs or acknowledging that
such a departure has already occurred.”).
64. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1856 (referring to the
‘legalization’ of the use of emergency powers and ‘its discontents’).
65. See Alex Brenninkmeijer, Dejuridisering [De-Juridification], 1
NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 6, 7 (2011) (discussing the problem of increasing
regulatory pressure caused by intense juridification and the need to move
toward de-juridification).
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1. Definition
De-juridification is defined as the erosion of law or the legal
dimension of our relationship with society, leaving certain social
actors outside official compulsion. De-juridification should not be
confused with de-regulation, which typically refers to the
removal of government regulatory controls from an industry and
in some cases, has resulted in the re-regulation of multiple
sectors.66 De-juridification goes much further and refers to the
politicization and the adoption of a non-legal approach to societal
conflicts that aims to comply with a necessity. This is
encapsulated in the Latin proverb necessitas non habet legem,
and was further analyzed by Machiavelli.67 While juridification
refers to the pathological growth of the power of law, dejuridification—often its symmetrical phenomenon—reflects its
reduction, which can be translated into fewer procedures and
rules, but not necessarily the non-involvement of the state.68 As
a result, a broader role for the executive and a greater
empowerment of private actors vis-à-vis public actors, namely
the legislature may emerge.
The concept of de-juridification conveys the idea of a less
‘legalistic’ approach to society which governments in different
countries have tried to concretize via enacting fewer rules and
less clearly defined norms for conduct. This has been realized
through framework legislation,69 moving from public law to
66. See, e.g., GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION?
REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES (1990).
67. “Necessity has no law.” See NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. 12
(Peter E. Bondanella ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1515).
68. See ALFIO MASTROPAOLO, IS DEMOCRACY A LOST CAUSE? PARADOXES
OF AN IMPERFECT INVENTION 109 (Clare Tame trans., 2011) (“Juridification is
the offspring of ‘constitutional democracy’ and basic rights . . . . Granted that in
many cases juridification corresponds to a symmetrical phenomenon of dejuridification, albeit more contained, neither are imaginable without the
state.”).
69. See WIM DUBBINK, ASSISTING THE INVISIBLE HAND: CONTESTED
RELATIONS BETWEEN MARKET, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 108 (2003) (“A society
is becoming more juridified and there are normative objections to this process.
At the same time, a process of de-juridification is taking place. This process is
due to the fact that laws contain less and less clearly defined norms for conduct.
Laws are turning into the so-called framework laws: laws which only become
meaningful by virtue of an additional layer of content drawn up by the civil
service.”). Framework legislation typically outlines goals and features of
legislation and establishes rules for delegation to the executive. See Elizabeth
Garrett, The Purpose of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
717, 718 (2004) (“Framework legislation creates rules that structure
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contracts with private entities and the de-judicialization of
government benefit programs.70 However, de-juridification does
not only mean that unnecessary bureaucratic rules will
disappear, but also that rights may be suspended and courts
may be marginalized during times of crisis. This typically occurs
on a temporary basis through the use of sunset clauses, as we
will explain in Part II, which justifies our focus on temporary dejuridification.
Regina Kreide asserts that de-juridification is concretized in
three aspects: 1) de-formalization of private law (e.g., through
the expansion of privatization processes in health, military, and
security);71 2) missing separation of powers in a multi-level
system through greater decentralization of power; and 3)
exclusion of a great part of the global population from access to
money, knowledge, power, and judicial protection.72 In a
juridified world, “laws colonize society,” but in a de-juridified
world, we face the risk that “power and money” will end up
colonizing it.73 This risk is particularly present in times ruled by
the dialectics of fear and panic.
2. De-Juridification and States of Emergency
The 2008–09 economic crisis and numerous terrorist attacks
congressional lawmaking; these laws establish internal procedures that will
shape legislative deliberation and voting with respect to certain laws or
decisions in the future. They are laws about the congressional lawmaking
process itself. Although frameworks often have an effect on the substance of the
laws to which they apply, the frameworks themselves are purely internal rules
relating to a particular set of legislative actions.”).
70. See HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 54, at 634 (“[W]e have seen this
effect most clearly in the move from public law to contract, not notably
successful, in securing de-juridification. Similarly, we noted the move to dejudicialize social security adjudication.”).
71. De-juridification concretized in the privatization of public tasks can
raise numerous concerns as to the quality and availability of the services, as
well as accountability problems. See, e.g., Andrew Bentz, Privatization and Its
Discontents, 63 EMORY L.J. 263 (2013) (providing an overview of the multiple
challenges of privatization); Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized
Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J.
417 (2013) (on private military companies); See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds.,
2009).
72. See Regina Kreide, The Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate
Governance in the International Context, 2 GLOBAL JUST.: THEORY, PRAC.,
RHETORIC 18, 22 (2009).
73. See HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A
GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY 116 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005).
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in Europe and the United States have taught us that excessive
juridification cannot shield us from these risks. Instead,
emergencies will force legislators to rethink and reinvent a
number of existing rules, and sometimes set aside a number of
them. Indeed, any emergency—political, economic, or natural—
will involve a form of government action that may infringe on
constitutionally protected political and economic rights and
liberties.74 Although the literature has distinguished between
the maintenance of a core of constitutional rights that should
remain untouched by a declaration of emergency and the need
to accept some malleability at the level of economic rights, the
truth is that some rights will necessarily be derogated in times
of crisis.75 At these times, however, government will often claim
that de-juridification is only temporary and will assume that it
is possible to rewind to the status quo ante.76
A temporary limitation of fundamental rights, suspension of
constitutional protections, and the acceleration of legal
procedures are sometimes unavoidable consequences of
emergency measures adopted to combat terrorism and provide
firm reactions to potential national security threats.77 Adequate
and rapid state actions are necessary in this context since
terrorists may feel that their target is not just an anonymous
citizen, but instead the state itself.78 As Günter Frankenberg
74. See Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 559 (2006) (“In the United States, the judiciary has tended
to accede to executive or legislative action limiting individual liberties during
emergency, either by postponing decision until after a crisis has concluded, or
by affirming the necessity of the government’s actions.”).
75. For a distinction between different types of emergencies and allowed
derogations from constitutional rights, see id. at 559. See also Mark Tushnet,
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 273 (2003).
76. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J.
480, 534–35 (2008) (arguing that sunset clauses can be used to promote a
continuous process of learning and ensure policy reversibility).
77. See Gabriel Malor, How Not to Fight Terrorism, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 28,
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ article/397317/how-not-fightterrorism-gabriel-malor (discussing the unconstitutionality and potential
ineffectiveness of a bill determining that terrorists should be stripped from
citizenship). “Because of its constitutional infirmity it would never work as
billed by its proponents. Instead, it would mobilize an army of bureaucrats at
Justice, State, and Homeland Security to start sniping away at Americans’
rights of citizenship and travel.” Id.
78. See Todd Sandler, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Overview,
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1–2 (2014) (“[T]errorists seek to circumvent normal
channels for political change by traumatizing the public with brutal acts so that
governments feel compelled to either address terrorist demands or divert public
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explains, “terrorist attacks need primarily to be repelled not
because they endanger innocent citizens but because they attack
the very heart of the state . . . [casting] doubt on [the] capability
of the state, [and threatening] the normative foundation of its
existence.”79 Timely and effective responses to terrorism and
other types of crises require extraordinary approaches—as the
saying goes, “all is fair in love and war.”
By distinguishing between a state of normal operations and
a state of emergency, states might be requested to de-juridify on
the legislative, administrative, and judicial levels.80 Such dejuridification, often translated into the temporary limitation of
constitutional protections, should, nonetheless, be limited and
circumscribed to the duration of situations of “exceptional and
imminent danger.”81 However, history has made it clear that
this is not always the case. Legislating at times of crisis is a
challenging task, which implies taking into consideration an
atypical scenario of rescission and enactment, as well as the
limitation of basic rights, in an attempt to reconcile the present
with past and future. This challenge is developed in Part III of
this article.
III. TIME, EMERGENCIES, AND SUNSETS
In this Part, we shift our conceptual analysis from dejuridification to its temporary character in times of crisis. As
mentioned earlier, emergencies are thought to be temporary and
thus require measures that are terminated at the end of a
certain period.82 In order to guarantee this termination, sunset
clauses are used to prevent normalization of the state of
exception and to enable legal frameworks to keep up with the
funds into hardening potential targets . . . . These and countless other incidents
since 9/11 indicate that the government must allocate resources in an effective
and measured manner to counterterrorism activities so that terrorists cannot
circumvent legitimate political processes or cause significant economic losses.
These losses may involve reduced foreign direct investment, lower economic
growth, less trade, reduced tourism, or lost values of stock and bond indexes.”)
(citations omitted).
79. GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE EROSION OF
THE RULE OF LAW: NORMALIZING THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 202 (2014).
80. See Alan Greene, Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The
Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12
GER. L.J. 1764 (2011).
81. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222.
82. See Malor, supra note 77.
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current state of affairs. However, law is usually not keen on
remaining current with the evolution of society.83 Rather, both
at the domestic and international levels, “delay is [normally] the
rule,”84 and rules that were supposed to be temporary often
remain after the period of crisis.85 In fact, this is a problem
common to both times of war and peace, since there is a tendency
for policies and laws to persist even “[w]hen [their] original
rationale is no longer applicable or has been proven invalid.”86
In this Part, we start by analyzing why the law has a
troublesome relationship with time. It appears to be challenging
to strike a balance between the past (state of normalcy where
citizens can exercise their rights), the present (state of
emergency where it is necessary to derogate some of these rights
so as to make rapid decisions), and the future (a state of
normalcy where any effects of temporary measures must be
erased). After exploring law’s nostalgia with the past, we delve
into the concept and functions of sunset clauses, arguing that
such clauses could close the gap between a state of normalcy
(juridification) and a state of emergency (de-juridification).
A.

LAW AND TIME

Although the idea of permanence appears to be traditionally
associated with legislation, law is inevitably constrained by
time.87 Laws are doomed to face a destiny like the mythological
character Kronos88: they overthrow existing laws, have a period
83. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and
the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 184 (2001)
(discussing the relationship between the evolution of technology and
international law and the interaction between the creation and change of
international rules and technological pressures). “[I]t is often the case that
technologically induced change to international law occurs in fits and starts,
sometimes in a timely fashion and sometimes after considerable delay.
Normally, delay is the rule in the formation of international law.” Id.
84. Id.
85. See Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Showcase Panel IV: A Federal Sunset
Law, the Federalist Society 2011 National Lawyers Convention, 16 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 339, 348 (2011) (explaining the reluctance to terminate laws is not
surprising since “it’s much more difficult to repeal a law than it is to pass it in
the first place, because, once enacted, an army of special interests surrounds
each law”).
86. See Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, Policy Persistence, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 1327, 1327–28 (1999) (describing the difficulty of terminating policies).
87. E.g., FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT:
TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION (2013).
88. Kronos was a mythological character, “the Titan god of time and the
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to reign, but are destined to be overthrown again by the next
generation. Like Kronos, legislators often experience the
“nostalgia of eternity,” refusing their mortality as well as that of
their rules.89 This nostalgia is often translated in the
‘détemporalisation’ of law, which has been in the vanguard of
totalitarian ideologies, cultural crises, and profound divergences
between law and status quo.90 Professor Ost’s détemporalisation
suggests the image of a law that has become detached from any
temporal dimension, as if it must inevitably govern our society
without end.91 Instead of enhancing legal certainty,92 and
increasing the effectiveness and deterrent effect of laws with the
course of time,93 longstanding laws easily become obsolete and
are converted into both sources of satire94 and abuse.95
On one hand, the disconnection between time and society
can be caused by a refusal to accept evolution or changed
circumstances, or on the other hand, by rupture. Law and its
institutions are the result of incremental change and profound
transitions. If the law is unable to advance at the pace of society,
technology, and the economy, the law will gradually lose effect.96
The necessary relationship between law and time should mirror
a balance between continuity, evolution, and rupture. This is
particularly exacerbated in times of crisis, since temporary
phenomena such as wars, economic instability, or political
ages, especially time where regarded as destructive and all-devouring.” Kronos,
THEOI GREEK MYTHOLOGY, http://www.theoi.com/Titan/TitanKronos.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2015).
89. See FRANCOIS OST, LE TEMPS DU DROIT 14–15 (1999).
90. Id. at 15–16.
91. Id.
92. See Sofia Ranchordás, Sunset Clauses and Experimental Regulations:
Blessing or Curse for Legal Certainty?, 36 STATUTE L. REV. 28 (2015) (exploring
the different dimensions of the principle of legal certainty and arguing that
temporary legislation does not necessarily create legal uncertainty, but can
further it because it creates sufficient certainty in the long run).
93. See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36–38
(1983) (arguing that the legal certainty of laws decreases over time); Tom Baker
et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 443, 449–464 (2004) (positing that deterrence may increase if law is less
predictable and sanctions are uncertain).
94. See, e.g., UK Chooses ‘Most Ludicrous Laws’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/7081038.stm (discussing outdated laws on duels).
95. E.g., Melissa J. Mitchell, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset
Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671 (2005).
96. See GARY E. MARCHANT ET AL., THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING
PROBLEM 19–30 (Anthony Mark Cutter et al. eds., 2011) (outlining the “pacing
problem in the context of regulation of emerging technologies”).
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upheaval usually require temporary and exceptional legislative
measures.97 Rupture of the status quo might be temporary in the
latter situations, but it can also become permanent when
legislators are confronted with a demand for innovative
institutions and instruments that replace the status quo. 98
The relationship between time and law is also visible in the
need to set a timetable for legislation. Timing rules, i.e.,
determining whether the benefits of a rule are created sooner or
later is another dimension of the relationship between time and
law, which can not only prevent the mentioned disconnection but
also maximize the effects of a law in light of uncertainty.99 An
example of this inflexion point are the triggering circumstances
which might allow the President of the United States to declare
a national emergency.
Emergency powers must therefore be constrained in some
manner in order to guarantee timely legal checks before further
delegation and/or fast-tracked decisions and regulation.100 This
is often concretized by introducing sunset clauses in existing
statutes or enacting ad hoc emergency legislation.101
B. EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND SUNSET CLAUSES
Sunset clauses102 (or provisions) are dispositions that
97. See Haskell, infra note 98.
98. In this context, it is important to distinguish between rupture and
revolution. E.g., John D. Haskell, The Strategies of Rupture in International
Law: The Retrenchment of Conservative Politics and the Emancipatory Potential
of the Impossible, 13 GER. L.J. 468, 468 (2012) (“Rupture is not necessarily the
same as speaking about revolution, or even emancipation for that matter,
because it does not necessitate any giving up of a certain system of ideas or
authority, at least not in any longstanding sense.”).
99. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal
Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 552, 558 (2007).
100. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1805.
101. See generally ANNA JASIAK, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON AD HOC
LEGISLATION (2011) (comparing the United States, Germany, and the
Netherlands).
102. It is important to distinguish between sunset clauses and sunrise
clauses. While sunset clauses determine the termination of a law or some of its
dispositions, sunrise clauses, on the contrary, only determine that a law will
come into effect later on a certain date. Until that period, the clause “lies
dormant.” MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH
FOR JUSTICE 142 (2009) (“[S]unrise clause . . . is a clause in a law that provides
for the coming into force rather than the termination of portions of the law . . .
after a specific date in the future and upon the satisfaction of specific
conditions.”).
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determine the expiry of a law or regulation within a predetermined period.103 Such provisions are conceived to
automatically erase legislation that is no longer necessary
because it has fulfilled its function or is no longer effective.
Before the law sunsets, it is generally subject to a final
evaluation. This is particularly true if there is a review trigger
or a “Henry VIII clause” providing a law will be amended by
secondary legislation.104 Although a sunset clause is designed to
terminate a piece of legislation at a certain point in time, the
latter may always be reauthorized on exceptional grounds.105
Sunset clauses allow for regulations to adjust to changing
social or technological circumstances and can be included in
emerging legislation to ensure that an enactment returns to the
pre-emergency situation. Sunset clauses may be motivated by
four main rationales: overcoming legislative inaction, generating
a temporary placeholder, allowing future decisions to be made
with better information, or protecting against legislative
panic.106 This Article focuses on the last rationale, which is
usually present in counterterrorism legislation.
Under a state of emergency, more powers are concentrated
in the hands of the executive, which often means that public
officials are allowed to limit fundamental guarantees, enacting
‘extra-legal measures’ to protect a nation confronted with grave
peril. As Oren Gross explains, the adequate enactment of these
measures “[m]ay strengthen rather than weaken, and result in
more rather than less, long-term constitutional fidelity and
103. See Sunset Clause, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/siteinformation/glossary/sunset-clause/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (“A provision in a
Bill that gives it an ‘expiry date’ once it is passed into law. ‘Sunset clauses’ are
included in legislation when it is felt that Parliament should have the chance
to decide on its merits again after a fixed period.”).
104. See Henry VIII Clause, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/
site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses/ (“The Government sometimes
adds this provision to a Bill to enable the Government to repeal or amend it
after it has become an Act of Parliament. The provision enables primary
legislation to be amended or repealed by subordinate legislation, with or
without further Parliamentary scrutiny. Such provisions are known as Henry
VIII clauses, so named from the Statute of Proclamations 1539 which gave King
Henry VIII power to legislate by proclamation.”). However, these instruments
would be incompatible with the U.S. doctrine of non-delegation since they
transfer the power to amend primary legislation to the executive. See J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
105. See Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability
in Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV.
393 (1981).
106. See Ip, supra note 18, at 82.
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commitment to the rule of law.”107 Since times of crisis produce
a tension of tragic dimensions between democratic values and
responses to emergencies, this tension is often solved by
introducing a sunset clause in emergency provisions.108 Ex ante
evaluations and evidence-based policy making play a limited
role in critical times, meaning that legislation can be hastily
adopted without sufficient empirical support.109 In this context,
sunset clauses aim to guarantee that the circumstances that
justified a certain piece of extraordinary delegation to the
executive are reassessed after a set period.
In the United Kingdom, review and sunset clauses have
been favored in order to improve the scrutiny of fast-track110 and
emergency legislation, most notably, the law that temporarily
suspended the local government in Northern Ireland after the
growth of urban terrorism in the area.111 In 2009, the
Constitution Committee of the House of Lords analyzed fasttrack legislation and pled for a presumption in favor of the use
of sunset clauses in the context of emergency legislation. The
Committee explained:
[W]here fast-track bills are used, there needs to be an
additional safeguard . . . . [I]n such cases, there should
instead be a presumption in favor of the use of a sunset
clause. By this process, a piece of legislation would expire
after a certain date, unless Parliament chooses either to
renew it or to replace it with a further piece of legislation
subject to the normal legislative process.112
Sunset clauses have been included in different examples of
emergency counterterrorism legislation.113 In the United States,
107. See Gross, supra note 24, at 1023.
108. Id. at 1028.
109. Van Stolk & Fazekas, supra note 21, at 163.
110. Fast-track legislation refers to legislation enacted in deviation of
normal legislative procedures and timetables, namely to respond to ‘urgent’
situations. “Bills . . . which the Government of the day represents to Parliament
must be enacted swiftly . . . and then [the former] uses its power of legislative
initiative and control of Parliamentary time to secure their passage.” SELECT
COMMITTEE
ON
THE
CONSTITUTION,
FAST-TRACK
LEGISLATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SAFEGUARDS, HL 116-I 2008-09 (UK), http
://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/116/11604.
htm.
111. Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, c. 22, sch. 1(5).
112. E.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 110.
113. See Finn, supra note 13.
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a number of sunset clauses were introduced in the USA
PATRIOT Act in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.114
Sixteen sections of this legislation were originally meant to
sunset on December 31, 2005. These provisions were included in
order to limit the duration of measures constraining the margins
of certain constitutional rights to a four-year period.115 The Act
was however reauthorized several times in the following years
following very limited evaluation—though many provisions
expired in the summer of 2015 and then were resurrected in a
new form in the USA FREEDOM Act.116 Although some of its
provisions expired this year after a long debate in Congress, a
few hours later, they reemerged in the USA Freedom Act.
Other countries followed this trend. In the last decade, the
inclusion of these clauses has been discussed in Germany and
the Netherlands. In Germany, the Counterterrorism Act
introduced several limitations to rights established by the Basic
Law on a temporary basis in order to safeguard national
security.117 An analogous provision was enacted in the
Netherlands (Wet Bestuurlijke Maatregelen Nationale
Veiligheid).118 Advising on the constitutionality of this
legislation, the Dutch Council of State argued that a sunset
clause should be introduced so as to limit extraordinary powers
and periodically assess the necessity and proportionality factors.
Periodic evaluation invited the government to weigh the

114. See generally Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1237 (2004) (discussing the application of a sunset rationale to
judicial decision-making in the post-9/11 world). USA PATRIOT stands for
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” Id.
115. Examples include interception of communications, disclosure of
communication, and surveillance orders. Section 224 of the USA Patriot Act
contained a sunset clause of five years. However, a number of sections were
renewed (e.g., sharing of criminal information and single-jurisdiction search
warrants). See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272
(2011).
116. USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015); Van
Stolk & Fazekas, supra note 21, at 161. The USA Patriot Act was to initially
sunset in 2005. Some of its sections were made permanent in that year while
others were extended until 2010.
117. Gesetz zur des Internationalen Terrorismus [Act for the Combat of
International Terrorism], Jan. 9, 2002, BGBL I, at 361, no. 3 (Ger.). A day before
these measures expired, a new law extending these limitations was enacted.
118. See generally STATE COUNCIL OF THE NETHERLANDS, ADMINISTRATIVE
MEASURES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, OPINION AND FURTHER REPORT II (2005–
06) (describing the rules governing decision-making and the imposition of
restrictive measures on persons for the protection of national security).
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restriction imposed by a specific emergency policy against the
continuing severity of the state of emergency. The opinion of the
Council to include a sunset clause was not welcomed by the
Dutch Minister of Justice, who refused to introduce it, affirming
that “terrorism cannot be regarded as a transitory problem.”119
The good intentions of the Dutch Council of State were clearly
misunderstood by the minister. Although terrorism is indeed a
lasting problem, it is important to limit the time extraordinary
powers are granted to the executive in order to guarantee that
these are revisited after a determined period of time.
Compared to unpredictable natural disasters, terrorism
carries both certain and uncertain elements—we know it exists,
but we are unable to predict when and where it will occur. At
times of higher risk, e.g., after the 9/11 attacks, or more recently,
when the United States started launching airstrikes on the
Islamic State in August 2014120—states might need to consider
new emergency measures or decide to review the effectiveness
and proportionality of existing ones. The use of sunset clauses
can therefore be placed in the context of a “lesser evil logic for
dealing with emergencies” that implies the suspension of
constitutional protections and the transfer of significant
extraordinary powers to the executive.121 Sunset clauses serve
several functions: limiting unnecessary temporal dejuridification, guaranteeing enhanced legislative oversight of
emergency powers, ensuring that extraordinary measures are
not normalized, and building consensus around potentially
controversial measures.
Consequently, sunset clauses renew legislative oversight,
wake legislators out of their natural inertia,122 and activate the
army of special interests that surrounds a law upon

119. Id. at 12–13 (arguing that an evaluation clause—rather than a sunset
clause—would suffice to guarantee that the extraordinary competences would
not remain for a longer period than necessary).
120. See, e.g., Jason Groves, Terror Target Britain: More Armed Police to
Patrol Streets as Threat Level is Raised to Its Highest for Years and Prime
Minister Warns that We Are in the Fanatics’ Sights, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2737724/Terror-attack-UK-highlylikely-warns-Home-Secretary-Theresa-May-threat-level-raised-severe.html
(describing Prime Minister Cameron’s Aug. 28, 2014 speech on terrorism).
121. See BOB BRECHER ET AL., DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF TERRORISM:
INTERROGATING TERROR 3 (2010).
122. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1676 (2002) (remarking that some policies
may be entrenched partly due to dependence and inertia).
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enactment123—attempting to ensure that emergency measures
do not live beyond the political, social, or economic crises that
justified enactment. “Legislative oversight of administration is a
nexus of administrative-political relation . . . .[T]he behavior of
legislators towards administrators when exercising their
oversight powers can therefore be viewed as an
operationalization of underlying normative values regarding
However,
this
political-administrative
relations.”124
operationalization can in some cases undermine, or even
destroy, original legislative intent. This feeling was prevalent in
the 1970s.125 As a result, a new instrument of legislative
oversight was added to the representatives’ toolbox, i.e., sunset
clauses. As explained infra, sunset clauses were not entirely new
legislative instruments in common law systems, but their
adoption as review and termination tools was innovative at the
time.
Gathering consensus for controversial pieces of legislation
that involves the limitation of constitutional protections can also
be far from a simple task. Divided government and significant
political opposition are often visible in legislative fragmentation
and a lack of provisions ensuring the continuity of legal regimes
or imposing future reconsideration.126 Sunset clauses create
more room for political bargaining and swiftly achieve the social
and political consensus that would have otherwise been absent
among legislators. Opponents to a specific law or provision
within it will be more willing to pass it, if there is a guarantee
that the previously existing status quo will return after the
sunset.127 This occurs when there is a conflict of multiple
interests or when information as to the potential (negative)
effects of law might be lacking. This promise to erase and rewind
can be particularly relevant in the context of economic and
123. See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity and
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 254 (2008).
124. See Mordecai Lee, Political-Administrative Relations in State
Government: A Legislative Perspective, 29 INT’L. J. PUB. ADMIN. 1021, 1023
(2006).
125. See Mark B. Bickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 209 (1985).
126. Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 123, at 255 (arguing that political
conditions at the time of the enactment of a law—namely the existence of a
divided government—can influence the probability that a law will be amended
and explaining how sunset provisions are substantial vehicles for encouraging
the building of coalitions and encouraging a law to be revisited).
127. Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and
Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 337 (2014).
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political crises.128
IV. DE-JURIDIFICATION IN TIME
This Part focuses on de-juridification of the legal order in
times of crisis pertaining to rights jurisprudence. Throughout
history, policymakers on both the national and international
levels have equally relied on the politicization rather than
juridification during emergencies.129 A careful examination of
the reaction of lawmakers in these turbulent times will show
that the trend of politicization is exemplified by the temporary
sunset of basic guarantees and the subsequent deactivation of
the courts, in combination or separately with temporary
delegation to the executive.
The practice of de-juridification through the adoption of
sunset clauses or similar temporary provisions is not a modern
phenomenon, nor is it confined to a single legal tradition.
Although these emergency measures were adopted on a
temporary basis, the principle of separation of powers was
placed in peril as a matter of course. Emergency laws have an
explicit impact on rights that may be openly asserted, while
separation of powers effects are equally significant, but
generally indirect since the system of divided roles is perceived
as a guarantee of liberties.130
The first subsection that follows explores the early use of
temporary suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus in United
States. The following subsection discusses the frequent use of
sunset clauses to de-juridify in the United Kingdom during the
First and Second World Wars. A third subsection focuses on the
reasons and causes of de-juridification during emergencies and
discusses its impact on fundamental rights. The final subsection
128. Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 123, at 255.
129. See Ludwik Ehrlich, British Emergency Legislation During the Present
War, 5 CAL. L. REV. 433, 436 (1917) (showing that the exigencies of the war
forced the UK Parliament to juridify aspects of social policies, such as the
obligation of British nationals to register with the National Registration Act
1915 or the military service in the regular army with the Military Service Act
1916).
130. The allocation of powers among different institutions does not
encompass only functional considerations to increase efficiencies. It is argued
that the decentralization of power prevents the development of authoritarian
regimes. This idea that the separation of powers serves the liberty of the
subjects was first expressed by Montesquieu and later by Madison. See
MONTESQUIEU: THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 162 (Anne Cohler et al. eds., 1989);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
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analyzes the impact of temporary legislation on separation of
powers, with a particular focus on judicial functions.
A. THE SEEDS OF DE-JURIDIFICATION IN THE SUSPENSION OF
HABEAS CORPUS
The procedural development of law has been a general
concern of scholars with various approaches, ranging from
conventional styles like Savigny that blur legal and societal
evolution,131 to those such as Watson that advocate more
nuanced and controversial approaches based on imitation and
legal transplantation.132 The rule of law has gradually been
enhanced, the spectrum of law has expanded to cover every
eventuality and jus became the predominant element of society.
This naturally led to a juridification of the social aspects of life.
Likewise, the development of human rights jurisprudence had
an equivalent progress.133 The legal framework of the protection
of rights therefore progressively became more impermeable,
covering wider ranges of law.
The writ of habeas corpus has played a significant role in
this process. This writ has served multiple functions since its
thirteenth century origins;134 however, its crystallization only
took place in the seventeenth century with the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679.135 The enactment of this Act—the emergence of the
‘great writ’—has been called one of the most efficient guarantees
of liberty.136 Fundamentally, this instrument challenges
unlawful arrest and detention.137 Habeas corpus is also
technically a procedural remedy and not a right,138 but as Dicey
131. See 1 FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN
LAW (William Holloway trans., Madras, J. Higginbotham, 1867).
132. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) (challenging the traditional perception that there is
a close connection between the evolution of law and the society in which it
operates).
133. See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 10 (2010) (marking the
development of the most important historical events in the rule of law, including
the writ habeas corpus and the abolition of torture). For a more thorough
account of the history of the rule of law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE
OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
134. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE
(2010).
135. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2.
136. See HALLIDAY, supra note 134.
137. See BINGHAM, supra note 133, at 13.
138. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
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said, the great writ may “declare no principle and define no
rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred
constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.”139
Though important, history has shown that this writ has been the
target of temporary de-juridification.
Interestingly, the first temporary suspension occurred less
than a decade later in 1688.140 The temporary suspension of
habeas corpus then became a common practice during the
eighteenth century when various plots against the Crown
emerged or threats of invasion surfaced.141 During the transition
to the new Hanoverian regime, another habeas corpus
suspension act was recorded;142 the end of the century saw not
only a series of successive habeas corpus suspension acts,143 but
also legislation with a three year sunset clause, which forbade
meetings of more than fifty people without prior permission from
a magistrate.144
On one hand, suspension of habeas corpus removed a
sensitive area of action from judicial control. The decision to
maintain imprisonment or not thus became an inherently
political decision. This practice is rooted in Roman
jurisprudence, with Cicero famously declaring that inter arma
enim silent leges (“in time of war, the law falls silent”).145 Several
centuries on, Rousseau observed that in times of emergencies
“the inflexibility of the laws, which keeps them from bending to
events, can in some cases render them pernicious, and through
them cause the ruin of a State in crisis.”146
On the other hand, repercussions from the suspension of
CONSTITUTION 120 (1982).
139. Id. at 118.
140. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2. See also MARK A.
THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: 1642 TO 1801 at 286
(1938) (“The passing of the Act desired by the Commons implied that henceforth
extraordinary powers could only be conferred upon the executive by Parliament
and for such time and in such manner as Parliament pleased.”).
141. MARK KNIGHTS, HANOVERIAN BRITAIN 5 (2011).
142. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 1.
143. See Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1714, 1 Geo. 1, c. 8 (“[T]o empower
his Majesty to secure and detain such Persons as his Majesty shall suspect are
conspiring against his Person and Government”). See also Habeas Corpus
Suspension Act, 1798, 38 Geo. 3, c. 36.
144. Seditious Meetings Act, 1795, 36 Geo. 3, c. 8.
145. MARCI TULLII CICERONIS, PRO TITO ANNIO MILONE, 4 (52 B.C.),
https://archive.org/details/oratioprotitoann00ciceuoft.
146. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER
POLITICAL WRITINGS 138 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997) (1762).
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habeas corpus are equally relevant to separation of powers
through deactivation of the courts.147 Across the Atlantic,
suspension of habeas corpus was expressly incorporated into the
text of the U.S. Constitution.148 In particular, President Lincoln
suspended the writ in 1861 during the Civil War and a case
challenging this decision was brought before the federal courts.
In Ex parte Merryman, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
delivered an opinion149 questioning whether the President had
the authority to use suspension powers without Congressional
authorization.150 President Lincoln disregarded this ruling and
made a choice he considered pragmatically necessary. In fact,
during an address to a Joint Session of Congress on July 4, 1861,
President Lincoln responded to the Court with a memorable
quote that underscored de-juridification: “are all the laws, but
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest
that one be violated?”151 Lincoln stressed that the Constitution
is silent on which branch of government has the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The conflict between President Lincoln and Chief Justice
Taney illustrates the early tension amongst the separation of
powers and represents early de-juridification by the executive
branch, albeit over the unequivocal disapproval of the Supreme
Court. President Lincoln made a correct decision—or perhaps, a
realistic one—given the peril the nation faced. Though the
question of which branch of the government had the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus is still officially
unanswered,152 Chief Justice Taney is frequently credited with
147. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer
From the Arguments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 BALT. L. REV. 11
(2005) (“[T]he question of which political branch has the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a classic constitutional separation of
powers question with important consequences for civil liberties.”).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it”).
149. At that time, Supreme Court justices had circuit duties and sat as trial
judges on lower federal courts. This practice was repealed by the Judiciary Act
of 1891. See 26 Stat. 826, § 14 (1891). See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road:
The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753
(2003).
150. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
151. For more details of the dialogue between Chief Justice Taney and
President Lincoln, see Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict Between the Chief Justice
and the Chief Executive: Ex Parte Merryman, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 262, 272
(2006).
152. See Jackson, supra note 147.
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the correct legal conclusion.153 The Merryman episode
established a precedent though that the existence of a state of
armed conflict is a political question that counsels judicial
deference.154 Nonetheless, it is questionable whether this
doctrine encompasses all cases of emergency or whether it is
confined to armed conflict.155
B. DE-JURIDIFICATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
A century later, emergency laws of temporary nature,156 also
called wartime acts, clogged the statute book based on two world
wars that monopolized Parliament’s agenda.157 Thorough
examination of those laws shows extensive de-juridification, not
just confined to fundamental rights areas, but also marked by
constant centralization of powers, since power was delegated
temporarily from Parliament to His Majesty’s government.
In particular, during the First World War, the government
introduced emergency legislation with temporary duration
“until to the end of the War,”158 or for a certain period—for
instance six months thereafter.159 In substance, most of these
acts limited rights and freedoms. Examples of this were
temporary suspension of freedom of assembly,160 prohibitions on

153. See CLINTON LAWRENCE ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 25–26 (1951).
154. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
155. This caveat is relevant to the phenomenon of terrorism due to its
peculiar dichotomy between war and crime. Unlike war, terrorism is not
organized and an armed conflict between states or other entities. Rather,
terrorism involves selective attacks against civilian and governmental targets.
See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032–
37 (2004).
156. However, not all emergency laws were temporary. See, e.g.,
Termination of the Present War (Definition Act), 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 59
(empowering the King-in-Council to define the termination of the war—without
a sunset clause).
157. For a detailed analysis on the emergency legislation during World War
I, see H. Geraldine Lester, British Emergency Legislation, 7 CAL. L. REV. 323
(1919). See also Ehrlich, supra note 129.
158. See, e.g., British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 21;
National Registration Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 60.
159. See, e.g., Special Acts (Extension of Time) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 72;
Price of Coal (Limitation) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 75.
160. Societies (Suspension of Meetings) Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 16.
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trading with the enemy,161 suspension of the grand jury,162 and
a ban on strikes in industries relevant to war munitions.163
These enactments empowered the executive, particularly the
Chancellor of the Exchequer in issues pertaining to war
finance164 and public undertakings,165 the Home Secretary,166
and the Prime Minister through the King-in-Council.167 Most
importantly, emergency acts with sunset clauses also affected
political rights, such as temporarily postponing elections168 and
suspending re-election for ministers.169
Likewise, in the wake of the Second World War, another
series of emergency acts were brought forward. The most notable
one was a temporary act to control the export of goods to
particular countries, hence limiting freedom of contract.170 This
Act delegated power to the Chamberlain government to regulate
exportation and imposed criminal penalties. It provided that:
This Act shall continue in force until such date as His
Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the date
on which the emergency that was the occasion of the
passing of this Act came to an end, and shall then expire
except as respects things previously done or omitted to

161. See Trading With the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 87; Trading With
the Enemy Amendment Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 79; Trading With the Enemy
(Amendment) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5 c. 31.
162. See Grand Juries (Suspension) Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 4.
163. See Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 54.
164. See, e.g., Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 89; War Loan Act,
1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5 c. 41; Government War Obligations Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5
c. 28.
165. See, e.g., Statutory Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo.
5 c. 44; Statutory Undertakings (Temporary Increase of Charges) Act, 1918, 8
& 9 Geo. 5 c. 44.
166. E.g., Police, Factories &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1916, 6 & 7
Geo. 5 c. 31.
167. See, e.g., Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 11.
168. See, e.g., Elections and Registration Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 11;
Parliament and Local Elections Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 13; Parliament and Local
Elections (No. 2) Act, 1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5 c. 50; Parliament and Local Elections
Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5 c. 22.
169. See, e.g., Re-Election of Ministers Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 50; ReElection of Ministers Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5 c. 22; Re-Election of Ministers (No.
2) Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5 c. 67.
170. See Import, Export, and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 2 & 3
Geo. 6 c. 69.

2016]

SNOOZING DEMOCRACY

63

be done.171
Nevertheless, no order was ever made causing the Act to
expire. Over forty years later, the Thatcher Government issued
the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1987172 and the Export of
Goods (Control) Order 1989,173 which prohibited the exportation
of particular items to several countries, including Iraq.
A case was brought before the Court of Appeal in 1995
concerning these orders. In essence, the appellants argued that
“[h]owever broad or loose a construction is to be given to ‘the
emergency,’ it cannot rationally be said to have continued up to
1987.”174 Therefore, the 1987 and 1989 orders were an abuse of
power based on the 1939 Act.175 The Court acknowledged that
the legislative intent behind the Act was the imminence of the
Second World War, but did not allow the appeal since
Parliament had the opportunity to repeal the Act during the
intervening period but presumably chose not to.176
This case illustrates the potential extent of emergency dejuridification and the absurd results that sometimes follow. The
rationale behind this choice seems to be that expediency ranks
higher than legality. However, this can become dangerous when
what was initially perceived as temporary becomes the new
status quo with a permanent character.
C. RIGHTS IN PAUSE
Crisis management is always a daunting task.177
Diachronically, the dilemma is reflected by the thoughts of
Abraham Lincoln, who wondered, “is there, in all republics, this
inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity,
171. Id. at § 9(3).
172. Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1987, SI 1987/2070.
173. Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989, SI 1987/2376.
174. R v. Blackledge [1995] 1 EWCA (Crim) 326.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 5. In reality, the court showed deference to the legislative branch
on this issue by stating, “[A] court order compelling a minister to bring into
effect primary legislation would bring the courts right into the very heart of the
legislative process. But the legislative process is for the legislature not the
judiciary.”
177. See Uriel Rosenthal & Alexander Kouzmin, Crises and Crisis
Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making, 7 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277 (1997) (discussing the challenges of crisis
management).
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be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to
maintain its own existence?”178 In times of crisis, the conflict
between liberty and safety de facto is resolved in favor of the
latter.179 Therefore, as it is commonly said, the ends usually
justify the means.180 The priority of the policymakers is to tackle
the threats for society as a whole while the protection of civil
liberties is temporarily diminished. At the international level,
this practice is commonly referred to as derogation.181
The scope of rights suspended depends on the impending
emergency. Nonetheless, not every right can be subject to
suspension. For instance, the European Convention on Human
Rights provides that no derogation shall be made pertaining to
the right to life, to the prohibition of torture and slavery, and no
punishment shall be imposed without law.182 Additionally, as a
general principle, limits to de-juridification may exist where
“[t]he infringement is not reversible, or the damage is
uncountable.”183
A recent case of de-juridification recorded in the United
Kingdom is indefinite detention of terrorism suspects.184 A bill
178. CHESTERFIELD SOCIETY, THE SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 325
(1908) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty
with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). See Conway v. Rimmer [1968]
AC 910 [982] (HL) (stating that “the flame of individual right and justice must
burn more palely when it is ringed by the more dramatic light of bombed
building”).
180. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 4 (2007) (“Civil liberties are compromised
because civil liberties interfere with effective response to the threat . . . .”).
181. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. See
Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 281 (1976). See also Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1981).
182. Id. at art. 15(2).
183. Antonios E. Kouroutakis, Separation of Powers and the War on Terror;
An Analysis of the Role of its Institution, 42 BRACTON L.J. 27, 43 (2010).
184. Two cases of de-juridification arising from the temporary suspension of
habeas corpus remedies are recorded in the same year in the United States. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that an executive order did
not have the power to detain Hamdi indefinitely and deprive him of due
process); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (dismissing the claim on
procedural grounds because the court lacked jurisdiction). Yet, these cases are
not appropriate for a comparison because the relevant Act of Congress did not
have temporal limits. Both petitioners were detained under the Executive Order
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was presented to the House of Commons on November 12, 2001
allowing the indefinite detention of foreign nationals implicated
in international terrorism.185 The initial proposal incorporated a
fifteen-month sunset clause.186 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and
Security Act later passed after the sunset period was extended
to five years on the suggestion of several Members of
and
the
Home
Affairs
Committee.188
Parliament187
Consequently, Sections 21–23 were to “cease to have effect at the
end of 10th November 2006.”189 This measure was challenged
before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in A v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department.190 The Law Lords’
decision held that the indefinite detention of foreign suspects of
terrorism without trial under the Act was incompatible with the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, but remained in effect since British
judges do not possess judicial review power.191
In practice, de-juridification means more discretion for the
political branches of government since law no longer establishes
standards of protection. Hence, legal protections depend on the
policy-making choices of the legislator, their discretion in
balancing competing alternatives, and the protection of
fundamental rights.
entitled “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism,” which was issued in accordance with an Act of Congress.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). See Amanda L. Tyler,
The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901
(2011).
185. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill 2001-2, H.L. Bill 49.
186. Id. at §§ 28(1)–(2)(c) (“(1) Sections 21 to 23 shall, subject to the following
provisions of this section, expire at the end of the period of 15 months beginning
with the day on which this Act is passed. (2) The Secretary of State may by order
(a) repeal sections 21 to 23; (b) revive those sections for a period not exceeding
one year; (c) provide that those sections shall not expire in accordance with
subsection (1) or an order under paragraph (b) or this paragraph, but shall
continue in force for a period not exceeding one year.”).
187. 375 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) col. 396.
188. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill 2001-2, H.C. Bill 351 c. 43.
189. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 29(7).
190. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (2004) UKHL 56.
191. 669 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) col. 161 (“In December 2003, the
committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Newton,
recommended that Part 4 of the 2001 Act should be repealed and replaced as a
matter of urgency. But that was not done while there was still time to do it; for
some reason, the Government waited until they were forced into action by the
decision of the Law Lords on 16 December . . . .”).
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It is noteworthy that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and
Security Act was reviewed twice based on statutory language192
following the Secretary of State’s order.193 Lord Lloyd of Berwick
clearly articulated this conclusion when he remarked that:
In December 2003, the committee under the
chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Newton,
recommended that Part 4 of the 2001 Act should be
repealed and replaced as a matter of urgency. But that
was not done while there was still time to do it; for some
reason, the Government waited until they were forced
into action by the decision of the Law Lords on 16
December . . . .194
The duration of de-juridification is another important
element in this equation. A priori, the duration of each crisis
cannot be measured. Policymakers commonly adopt a sunset
clause and before its expiration, they might renew the legislation
if the crisis has not fully concluded. However, the promulgation
of sunset clauses with indefinite duration is incompatible with
the rationale of emergency legislation and has unintended
consequences. As mentioned supra,195 the 1995 Court of Appeal
decision on the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence)
Act of 1939, signals the ease by which emergency legislation can
become a routine power used by government.
A member of the House of Commons’ Select Committee on
Home Affairs has emphasized:
As we all know, the history of anti-terrorism legislation
is that when it is introduced, it is represented as
temporary and as a response to some immediate crisis,
but it has a habit of becoming permanent. I have

192. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 28.
193. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 (Continuance in Force of
Sections 21–23) Order 2003, SI 2003/691; Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security
Act 2001 (Continuance in Force of Sections 21–23) Order 2004, SI 2004/751.
194. 670 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) col. 161.
195. An example of one of these extensions would be in 1995 when the Court
of Appeals analyzed the validity of emergency legislation, the Import, Export
and Customs Powers (Defense) Act of 1939, which was passed during the Second
World War. Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo.
6 c. 69, § 9(3) (“This act shall continue in force until such date as His Majesty
may by Order in Council declare to be the date on which the emergency that
was the occasion of the passing of this Act came to an end . . . .”).
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therefore tabled—as have others, probably—a sunset
clause which requires the Government to come back to
Parliament after five years to go through the entire
legislative process to obtain the powers that they seek in
part 4. We picked five years—others may choose a
shorter or a longer period—because there is a precedent
for it. 196
That said, in times of crisis, it seems sunsetting laws mean
that human rights protections depend primarily on the
policymaking choices of the executive and on its discretion in
balancing between specific policies and the protection of rights.
The ends justify the means and rule of law is consequently
replaced by the rule of discretion.197 De-juridification removes
the legal constraints in the exercise of power and policymakers
have broader room for maneuver and a relatively free hand.
Such de-juridification, however, is not unlimited since a number
of human rights guarantees, such as the rights enlisted in the
European Convention on Human Rights, are not subject to
modification.
Even in spite of Ex parte Merryman, de-juridification should
be subject to judicial review. Courts must have a significant role
in the protection of rights, even though their role is mainly ex
post facto and exercised with deference in wartime. In some
cases though, the judiciary can be a victim of de-juridification.
D. JUDICIAL DEACTIVATION
The question of which branch of the United States
government has the power to suspend habeas corpus still
remains unanswered. What is agreed, though, is that temporary
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus deactivates the courts.198
The sunsetting of particular rights and freedoms has an
equivalent impact. Courts are the frontrunners in the
196. 375 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) col. 62–63.
197. Dicey has said that, “the rule of law is contrasted with every system of
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or
discretionary powers of constraint.” See DICEY, supra note 138, at 110.
198. However, the permanent restriction on alien detainees’ use of habeas
corpus to access federal courts has been ruled unconstitutional. See Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). Congress adopted the Military Commissions
Act in 2006, prohibiting alien detainees or suspected enemy combatants from
using the writ of habeas corpus to petition federal courts. In Boumediene, the
Court held the prohibition unconstitutional.
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juridification of our society—they implement the law, define its
meaning, determine gaps, fill vacuums, and conduct
constitutional review.199 Curtailing certain rights under
sunsetting deactivates courts in the same manner as suspension
of habeas corpus.
One of the most famous examples of judicial deactivation
was when Japanese and Japanese-Americans on the west coast
were moved to internment camps during the Second World War.
In an attempt to explain the relatively powerless role of the
courts, Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent underlined this
issue:
Of course, the existence of a military power resting on
force, so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless
of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I
would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review
that seems to me wholly delusive . . . .The chief restraint
upon those who command the physical forces of the
country, in the future as in the past, must be their
responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.200
Judicial deactivation has a profound impact on the
protection of basic guarantees. Since Marbury v. Madison201 in
1803, many legal orders with separated powers have entrusted
courts with the task of constitutional review and the protection
of enumerated rights202—a trend also apparent today in
Commonwealth nations.203
199. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Josephine Ann Bickel ed., 2d ed. 1986).
200. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944).
201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
202. Since World War II, the dominant paradigm of constitutionalism is the
enhanced role of the courts in constitutional review, especially regarding the
Bill of Rights. See John E. Ferejohn, Constitutional Review in the Global
Context, 6 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2002). A proponent of this model is Ronald
Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
However, this model has been criticized by numerous academics. See RICHARD
BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New
Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything So That Everything Would
Remain the Same,” 32 ISR. L. REV. 250 (1998).
203. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of
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This phenomenon was also echoed in a series of U.S.
Supreme Court cases decided in the aftermath of World War I.
Congress passed legislation that limited freedom of contract for
a period of two years, and in certain circumstances allowed a
tenant to remain in their rental beyond their lease term if they
continued to pay rent.204 Restriction of a landlord’s eviction
power was necessitated by the emergencies of war. Justice
Holmes echoed the passive wartime role of courts in this case,
stating, “a declaration by a legislature concerning public
conditions that by necessity and duty it must know, is entitled
at least to great respect. In this instance Congress stated a
publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact.”205
Past experience has shown that courts tend not to intervene
during emergencies, and in reality defer to the political branches
of the government for guidance. This is a dangerous proposition
since the standards of protection in these periods are lower due
to sunset legislation. In this scenario, it is even more important
that judicial discretion to intervene is maintained. When
fundamental protections are sunsetted, the judge therefore
becomes an ultimum refugium.
V. DE-JURIDIFICATION AND SUNSET CLAUSES AT
TIMES OF CRISIS
In this Part, we ask what the real problem of dejuridification in the midst of crisis is: is it the fact that rights are
suspended or that ‘temporary’ rules are enacted to confer more
powers to the executive branch. Until now, we have argued that
de-juridification is not per se unsatisfactory; in fact, it can be
necessary to guarantee the adoption of timely decisions.
In the first segment, we unveil the heart of the matter is the
misuse of sunset clauses to de-juridify our legal order. As we
have demonstrated in our historical account, some emergency
measures never seem to sunset after emergency circumstances
are resolved. In Section A, we delve into the past misuse of
sunset clauses and explain why de-juridification and sunset
clauses, as its instrument, have acquired a bad reputation.
Section B, suggests a normative framework for a more effective
use of sunset clauses during times of crisis (and beyond).
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001).
204. Food Control and District of Columbia Rents Act, Pub. L. No. 66-63,
§ 101, 41 Stat. 297 (1919).
205. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921).
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A. THE RECENT PAST OF SUNSET CLAUSES AND DEJURIDIFICATION
As mentioned supra, the USA PATRIOT Act was one
example of many anti-terrorism enactments that utilized sunset
clauses.206 Sunset provisions contained in the Act were included
in order to limit the duration of measures constraining certain
freedoms to a five year period.207 At this time, there was thought
to be a higher level of terrorist threat. This Act was, however,
reauthorized in the following years and some of its provisions
have likely become permanent.208
Although existing constitutional and criminal law
structures might be ill-equipped to respond to terrorism,209
sunset clauses might be an important tool to avoid the
normalization of emergency powers.210 As demonstrated in our
historical overview, the suspension of laws, human rights, and
the deactivation of courts in turbulent times “eats away the
foundations of republican government.”211 This is particularly
apropos if emergency powers live beyond the initial tragedy that
gave rise to the state of emergency. Discretion, efficient decisionmaking, and expediency are fundamental elements of dejuridification since law is not omnipresent. As a result, dejuridification seems to be the appropriate medicine to combat
206. In Canada, Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act which was
incorporated into the Criminal Code under ‘Part II.1—Terrorism.’ AntiTerrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41. A sunset clause was included in the bill (Section
83.32), sunsetting sections 83.28, 83.29 and 83.3 concerning preventative
arrests and investigative hearing powers, after a five-year period. In Britain,
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which amended the Terrorism Act
2000, introduced the indefinite detention of foreign suspects of terrorism
without trial and was subject to a 5-year sunset clause. See Anti-Terrorism,
Crime, and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 23.
207. Examples of the de-juridification include the interception and
disclosure of communications and surveillance orders. Although section 224 of
the USA PATRIOT Act contained a four-year sunset clause, a number of its
sections were later renewed, including the sections regarding sharing of
criminal information and single-jurisdiction search warrants. USA PATRIOT
ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001).
208. The USA PATRIOT Act was to terminate in 2005, but was reauthorized.
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
209. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
210. For a more detailed analysis of the use of sunset clauses to address
temporary problems including terrorism, see RANCHORDÁS, supra note 14, at
62–64.
211. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1801.
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emergencies. In that respect, sunset clauses have proven to be
an adequate formula for de-juridification. Sunset clauses are an
integral element in this process, and what is neglected from the
criticism is not that sunset clauses fail to expire at the end of the
emergency, but that once normality is restored, juridification
and its positive effects fail to reemerge.
Although used for centuries, sunset clauses do not have a
good reputation in the legal literature.212 They are thought to be
ineffective, costly, and unable to impede the “normalization of
The
repeated
extensions
of
the
extraordinary.”213
counterterrorism legislation, à la the USA PATRIOT Act, is a
classic example of sunset clauses’ inability to terminate
emergency legislation. Adopting sunset clauses was an
important tool in gathering consensus for this bill.214 Sunset
provisions were supposed to guarantee that limitations on civil
liberties would not become entrenched, but would rather be
reevaluated after a determined period. This instrument was
supposed to allow Congress to revisit this Act and based on new
information, correct possible policymaking errors by revising or
repealing unnecessary rules.215 Conversely, these sunset clauses
produced the opposite effect, facilitating the long-term
entrenchment that they were originally designed to prevent.
In this way, sunset clauses have been abused to gather
consensus regarding controversial, and often emergency, laws
that would have not been adopted otherwise. The consensusgathering virtue attributed to sunset clauses frequently evolves
into a vice and “sunset clauses have been transformed from an
instrument of better government into a clever political trap.”216
Sunset clauses are thus said to be easily employed as “a
convenient
political
excuse
for
shortcutting
initial
parliamentary debate about controversial legislation” and
delaying essential discussions on the sunset moment.217
212. For a thorough account of the reasons why sunset clauses have
developed this ‘bad reputation,’ see RANCHORDÁS, supra note 14.
213. Ip, supra note 18, at 87.
214. See Sara A. Chandler, Collateral Damage? The Impact of National
Security Crises on the Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable
Searches, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 225–26 (2006).
215. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1790 (2013).
216. Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Feb. 2004, at
67.
217. Nicola McGarrity et al., Sunset Clauses in Australian Anti-Terror Laws,
33 ADELAIDE L. REV. 307, 308 (2012).
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According to the literature, there seems to be “an institutional
bias in favor of the status quo—agreement is required to change
a policy, but no agreement is required to sustain it.”218 This is
often described as a result of so-called ‘legislative inertia’ created
by the interaction of legislators and interest groups.
Maintenance of policies, regardless of their effectiveness, can be
an important way of ensuring the survival of stakeholder
organizations such as regulatory agencies.219
This bad reputation is not exclusive to emergency
legislation, but has also been the result of the deficient
implementation of sunset clauses in other fields. According to
Rebecca Kysar, in the field of tax law, sunset clauses were
employed during the Bush Administration “as apparatuses [to]
underestimate the revenue costs of legislation or fit the
legislation within predetermined budget constraints . . . and
function as rent-extracting mechanisms.”220 By enacting sunset
clauses instead of permanent tax provisions, lawmakers could
reduce the estimation of the revenue costs of these laws, since
the calculation would only take the sunset period into account.
However, in practice, the original plan was to renew these tax
cuts later and circumvent budgetary constraints under the cover
of a temporary provision.221
Finally, the non-selective use of sunset clauses in the 1970s
and 80s can explain their bad reputation. The ‘sunset boom’ at
the state level was motivated by the desire to limit the growing
power of executive agencies, rather than by the economic crisis
in the 1970s. An excessive number of sunset clauses resulted, for
example, in deficient evaluations and incorrect evaluation
periods. According to Kearney’s 1990 study, most sunset clauses
were typified by incorrect sunset review periods.222 Excessively
short periods burdened sunset commissions with constant
reviews, which meant that several automatic reauthorizations
took place. The retrospective evaluation of sunset clauses
became, in many cases, a mere formality that did not impede
218. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, Policy Persistence, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
1327, 1328 (1999).
219. See STELLA Z. THEODOULOU & CHRIS KOFINIS, THE ART OF THE GAME:
UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 206 (2004).
220. Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2006).
221. See Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical
Evaluation and Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656 (2011).
222. See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State
Experience, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 51 (1990).
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agencies from continuing ineffective and unnecessary programs.
These pathologies continue to affect the reputation of sunset
clauses today and diminish hope for a brighter future for dejuridification.
B. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
Juridification can also be stigmatized because it represents
a reality where jus is the predominant element of society.223
However, history has shown that the reality of limitless dejuridification at times of crisis can be uglier. Sunset clauses have
walked side-by-side with de-juridification to guarantee the
temporary limitation of fundamental rights and enhanced
legislative oversight. However, these legislative instruments
have not always fulfilled their mission. Temporary dejuridification requires a normative framework that can set
boundaries for the spaces susceptible of juridification.
Firstly, an important step would be to clearly define the
situations that can and should be de-juridified on a temporary
basis. An inflexible definition of a state of emergency and the
reasons that justify the temporary measures must be provided.
This would minimize the possibility that emergency powers
remain valid after the emergency has ceased to exist. A
statement of reasons would invite the legislature to reflect upon
both the need for emergency de-juridification and its duration.224
In addition, before emergency de-juridification, legislatures
should investigate whether a certain situation is the result of
serious dangers or merely risks. Luhman’s distinction between
risk and danger exemplifies this issue: risk “refers to the
potential future loss as a consequence of a decision . . . and we
can speak of risk only if we can identify a decision without which
the loss could not have occurred,” whereas danger refers to “the
potential loss resulting from something external to the one
affected.”225 Terrorism and natural disasters can be qualified as
dangers because they are unexpected, whereas some economic
policies (e.g., investment in risky securities or financial
speculation) will easily fall into the category of risks. This
distinction is nonetheless fluid and a risk for one person could
223. Teubner, supra note 41, at 3.
224. See Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency: Washington’s Use of Emergency
Clauses and the People’s Right to Referendum, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 219 (2008).
225. Max Boholm, The Semantic Distinction between ‘Risk’ and ‘Danger’: A
Linguistic Analysis, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 281, 282 (2012).
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be a danger for others; Christian Borch explains, “heavily geared
investment in the financial markets [risk] might trigger a
financial collapse which has negative effects on people who did
not speculate [danger].”226 In such a scenario, de-juridification
might be justified to tackle the results of a danger which was
unexpected to most citizens.
In the case of risks, legislators might decide to adopt sunset
clauses in order to gather more information related to a certain
phenomenon. Kysar, despite her critical position toward
temporary legislation, acknowledges that sunset clauses have
been used in the United States as an instrument to assess the
risks and effects of a new policy, as well as to obtain more
information about it during the interim period between
enactment and sunset.227 In such cases, sunset clauses may be
employed to experiment with a new act, rather than to dejuridify.
A natural question is whether there are sectors that should
never be de-juridified, even on a temporary basis. As mentioned
supra, this may be so in prohibiting torture or in relation to a
number of core legal institutions like legislative non-delegation,
which are essential for the functioning of any state and
society.228 This is exemplified by the German ‘eternity clause’
and unamendable provisions of its Basic Law,229 as interpreted
by the Federal Constitutional Court. In 1976, this court affirmed
that “laws that are indispensable for the legal capacity and
[normal] functioning of a state”230 and the laws that are required
for the concretization of fundamental rights guarantees (e.g.,
media and broadcasting laws) are not compatible with a
temporary or transitory nature.
After having decided whether a social space can be dejuridified, policymakers should reflect upon the duration of the
sunset clause. This period should coincide with the emergency,
lasting long enough to allow the executive to effectively manage
an issue and gather information as to its nature, but should not
be disproportionate. Another important element of temporary
226. CHRISTIAN BORCH, NIKLAS LUHMANN 100 (2011).
227. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1042 (2011).
228. Volker Bouffier, Normprüfung: Modifizierung des Hessischen
Befristungskonzepts, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 55 (2012) (Ger.).
229. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of
Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2014).
230. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Feb. 8, 1977, 1 BVR 79, 278, 282/70 (Ger.).
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de-juridification is retrospective evaluation by the legislature,
and courts if necessary (or ex post evaluation).
As mentioned before, the adoption of a sunset provision
increases the probability that political opponents will support
new laws due to the promise of future revision.231 Evaluations
should therefore be an essential element of de-juridification. The
necessity of extraordinary measures should be reassessed after
a certain period, preferably by an independent evaluation
commission, and the transparency of this evaluation should be
guaranteed, when possible, by the publication. In some cases
though, the publication of information may be contrary to
national security interests. Nevertheless, reconsidering the
necessity of a certain regulation can ensure that the executive
takes new information into account, reassesses the underlying
regulatory problem, and evaluates the effects of the rules at
stake.232
Any evaluation should be used to assess the effects of the
sunset disposition and verify whether objectives have been
achieved. Depending on the evaluation report, an informed
decision can then be made as to whether to let the provision
sunset or renew. The secret to the successful adoption of sunset
clauses and the consequent de-juridification at times of crisis
seems to be highly dependent on the commitment of the
executive branch to conduct meaningful sunset reviews and
provide legislators with accurate and complete information.233
This implies that legislators must also ensure that the
evaluation techniques and criteria provided in legislation are
adequate to the programs that will later be evaluated.234
V. CONCLUSION
Juridification has a negative connotation. It symbolizes the
excessive role of jus in societal relationships, invading every
facet of our life, imposing norms, and regulating processes.
Conversely, crises demand fast and effective decisions instead of
231. See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 255 (2008).
232. EUR. COMM’N, MANDELKERN GROUP ON BETTER REGULATION FINAL
REPORT 19 (2001), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/
documents/mandelkern_report.pdf.
233. See Sandra M. Vidas, The Sun Also Sets: A Model for Sunset
Implementation, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 1169, 1193–94 (1976).
234. See id.
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burdensome procedures. In this Article, we argued that dejuridification is necessary at critical times and can be executed
through a broader use of sunset clauses. Emergencies require
less bureaucracy transfer of decision-making power from the
legislature to bodies with expertise, and broad consensus in
decision-making. Sunset clauses may be a useful mechanism to
achieve these goals. However, sunset clauses are just one of
many instruments of de-juridification. This is the basis for the
key question of why sunset clauses often fail to have meaningful
effect and why de-juridification may be preferable to
juridification.
The annals of history have repeatedly shown that the
rhetoric of emergency and de-juridification at times of crises can
be dangerous. For example, many oppressive regimes found
their genesis with the establishment of emergency powers that
became normalized.235 As a result, this Article analyzed the
historical use of temporary legislation to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and facilitate the adoption of controversial
measures such as indefinite detention in the context of terrorism
and the USA PATRIOT Act. Too frequently, temporary
suspensions of constitutional rights became excessive, and
emergency legislation lived beyond the emergency it was meant
to tackle.
De-juridification is, however, not solely a source of
challenges. The aim of this Article was rather to explain why dejuridification can sometimes be desirable, and how history has
taught us to use the weapons of de-juridification, such as sunset
clauses, in a nuanced manner. Sunset clauses promise to erase
legislative provisions that might be unnecessary after times of
crisis, and ‘rewind’ legislation to the original status quo after the
end of this critical period. This may be a dangerous promise,
however, that comes at the price of basic guarantees and the
principle of separation of powers. It is nonetheless possible to
bring the best out of temporary de-juridification by enacting
sunset clauses within a normative framework that cogently
distinguishes between risks and dangers, ‘sunsettable’ and ‘nonsunsettable’ subject areas, and adequate sunset periods, placing
a strong emphasis on evaluation.
Although the de-juridification of social spheres and rights
might seem at first sight an attractive alternative to excessive
legalization and regulation of lawmaking procedures, fewer rules
235. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1809.
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might also result in the reduction of key civil liberties and our
system of checks and balances. Less is not always more, unless
it is not meant to last.

